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Abstract
In the 2008 budget of the Minister of Finance, the South African Government proposed
to impose a 2 cents/kilowatt-hour (c/kWh) tax on the sale of electricity generated from non-
renewable sources; this tax is to be collected at source by the producers/generators of electricity.
The intention of this measure is to serve a dual purpose of protecting the environment and
helping to manage the current electricity supply shortages by reducing demand. The objective
here is to evaluate the impact of such an electricity generation tax on the South African, SACU
and SADC economies.
The paper ￿rstly considers the theoretical foundations of an electricity generation tax sup-
ported by international experiences in this regard. This section also contrasts the suitability of
a permit with a tax system to achieve CO2 emission reduction
We subsequently apply the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model to evaluate the
impact of an electricity generation tax on the South African, SACU and SADC economies. We
simulate the proposed tax as a 10 percent increase in the output price of electricity. We assume a
closure rule that allows unskilled labour to migrate and a limited skilled workforce. As expected,
the electricity generation tax will reduce demand. Due to the decrease in domestic demand,
export volume increases and import volume decreases, this is despite a weaker terms of trade.
We also found that unemployment for unskilled labour increases and wages of skilled workers are
expected to decrease. A unilateral electricity generation tax will bene￿t other SACU and SADC
countries through an improvement in relative competitiveness, as shown by the improvement
of the terms of trade for these regions. If, however, the bene￿ts of pollution abatement are
internalised, then electricity generation tax is expected to yield a positive e⁄ect on the South
African economy.
1 Background1
The South African Government proposed to impose a 2 cents/kilowatt-hour (c/kWh) tax on the
sale of electricity generated from non-renewable sources This tax is to be collected at source by the
producers/generators of electricity. The intention of this intervention is to reduce South Africa￿ s
carbon dioxide emission load and to help manage the current electricity supply shortages by reducing
demand (Republic of South Africa 2008).
The world produced approximately 49,000 million ton (Mt) CO2equivalent in 2004, mainly from
deforestation and energy generation. South Africa￿ s share is about 1% of the global ￿gure, or 440Mt.
The emissions per capita in South Africa are very high, i.e. 9.5tCO2-eq., compared to averages of
5.0tCO2-eq. for developing countries and 6.8tCO2-eq. for the world. Emissions per capita of Brazil
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1are 13.1t CO2-eq., China 3.9t CO2-eq. and India 1.8t CO2-eq. per person. African and developing
countries emit less CO2 for a unit of GDP than the world average but South Africa is the exception
and emits more than OECD countries. South Africa￿ s emissions per GDP, or its emission intensity,
is 0.75kg/$, whereas the world average is 0.56kg/$ (Winkler 2007).
Eskom dominates the electricity distribution industry in South Africa. As shown in Table 1,
coal-￿red power stations contribute approximately 89 percent of electricity generation capacity in
South Africa. Eskom owns 96 percent of all generation capacity in South Africa and 100 percent of
the national transmission grid. 60 percent of electricity is distributed directly to end-use customers
and the remaining 40 percent is distributed through municipal distributors (Republic of South Africa
2007). However, the electricity distribution industry is currently in a process of restructuring. In
March 1997 the South African Cabinet approved consolidation of the electricity distribution industry
into six Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs). Since then, the establishment of REDs has been
met with limited success. On 25 October 2005, in an attempt to address the challenges that the
distribution sector faces, Cabinet approved the creation of six ￿wall-to-wall￿REDs. These REDs
should be created as public entities and the Department of Minerals and Energy, through Energy
Distribution Industry (EDI) Holdings, should oversee and control their establishment (Republic of
South Africa 2007).
The South African electricity usage is characterised by a few energy intensive industries as shown
in Table 2. The Mining and extraction industry consumes more than 50 percent of electricity, but
contributes only 3 percent to domestic production at market prices and 14.58 percent to exports
at market prices. Similarly, the ￿Electricity￿and ￿Utility and construction￿industries consume 25
percent of electricity, but only contribute 6.17 percent to domestic production and 0.58 percent to
exports at market prices.
South Africa is a member of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) which facilitates electricity
distribution within SADC. As shown in Table 3, South Africa recorded a trade surplus in electricity
from 2003 to 2008 of between 3 000 GWh and 4 500 GWh.
The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of an electricity generation tax on
the South African, SACU and SADC economies The next section considers the theoretical founda-
tions of an electricity generation tax and examines some evidence put forth by similar studies. In
the third section, the model and data are discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the results.
The last section contains the conclusion, as well as the limitations of the model.
2 Literature Review2
2.1 Introduction
This section contrasts the suitability of a permit system and a tax system for CO2 abatement in the
South African electricity industry. Also, the appropriate tax base is discussed and some evidence
is provided in favour of an electricity generation tax. Lastly, the potential for a double dividend is
explored.
2.2 Permits or taxes?
Economic measures make use of the price mechanism to internalise the negative externalities asso-
ciated with fossil fuel use. These measures could be used, at least cost to the economy, to achieve
environmental targets. If marginal abatement costs could be equalised across all agents, action will
be taken at the points in production that will result in the most e¢ cient and cheapest abatement
(UP 2007). UP (2007) identi￿ed tradable emissions schemes and taxes on emissions (or proxies of
emissions) as the two most important economic measures in the context of emissions reductions.
2This part of the paper is an outcome of commissioned research for The National Treasury (South Africa) and
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2Taxes on emissions, also called Pigouvian taxes, require that the total value of damage caused by
an extra unit of emissions is equal to the tax levied per unit of emissions (Norregaard & Reppelin-Hill
2000). The result of this tax is to signal the true social cost of pollution to the emitter, who then has
the ￿nancial incentive to reduce emissions to the point where the ￿nancial implication of one unit
reduction to the emitter, is equal to the social damage involved. On the other hand, in a system of
marketable permits, permits are allocated by the regulatory authority that is equal to the aggregate
quantity of emissions. This allocation could, for example, be through an auction (Norregaard and
Reppelin-Hill 2000).
According to McKibben and Wilcoxen (2002), especially under uncertainty, taxes on emissions
tend to be more e¢ cient than a permit system. Furthermore, Rosen (1999) remarks that the relevant
issue is not whether the perfect method of dealing with externalities is taxing emissions, but rather,
whether or not they are likely to be better than other alternatives.
2.3 The tax base
In general, the environmental taxes have three e⁄ects on an economy (Van Heerden et al. 2006):
1. An environmental tax creates a distortion in the economy that leads to an increase in produc-
tion costs. This will lead to a general increase in the price level of the economy. The higher
production costs will decrease export demand and increase import demand. As a result, output
in trade related services, especially energy intensive products, will decrease. Therefore, labour
will be reallocated from these sectors to non-traded sectors.
2. It will increase government revenue, but if this revenue is not recycled, purchasing power and
household consumption will decrease.
3. The distortion created by the tax will induce a change in consumer behaviour, for example,
substitution away from energy and energy-rich sectors. This could lead, in the long run, to
more e¢ cient technologies.
All three e⁄ects contribute to the reduction in energy demand and therefore to a reduction of
carbon emissions in the taxing country (Van Heerden et al. 2006).
The use of fossil fuels in production can be taxed at di⁄erent stages of production. As shown in
Table 4, environmental taxes and charges can be de￿ned based on the point in production where the
statutory burden rest. Taxes can be raised on the outputs themselves at the consumption stage; the
production of fossil fuels; their use as inputs; or governments can choose to tax the actual emissions
of greenhouse gasses.
The choice of where to tax fossil fuel use has several e⁄ects. Firstly, there is an e⁄ect on the
emission reduction incentives Generally, the closer the tax incidence is to the source of emissions, the
more e⁄ective the tax. Secondly, taxing end-consumption has a smaller e⁄ect on the competitiveness
of the country, than taxing production (UP 2007). Thirdly, the placement of the statutory tax
incidence a⁄ects the distribution of income in the economy. Lastly, the administration costs and
feasibility of the tax are determined by the point of production where the tax is levied (UP 2007).
However, it should be remembered that the goal of environmental taxation is to reduce emissions
through redirecting behaviour away from actions that are detrimental to the economy. According
to conventional tax wisdom, environmental taxation will be most e⁄ective in in￿ uencing behaviour,
if the activity causing the pollution is taxed directly (OECD 2001). Therefore, where there is a
clear environmental objective, the tax should be targeted as directly as possible. The preferred
situation is a direct link between the tax and the environmental issue. If this is the case, incentives
to change behaviour are likely to be stronger and unintended e⁄ects will be minimised (Republic
of South Africa 2006) The implication for CO2 emissions is to tax the actual emissions directly.
Unfortunately, this is usually not a feasible option due to the high administration cost associated
3with such a tax. As a result, no country has ever imposed a direct tax on actual emissions (UP
2007) The closest proxy for actual emissions taxes is an input tax on fossil fuels that discriminates
based on the carbon content of di⁄erent fuels used in the production process (UP 2007).
It should be noted that the direct e⁄ects of energy taxes are usually found to be regressive, due
to the relatively high proportion of income spent on energy by poorer households. However, these
regressive e⁄ects tend to be smaller when indirect e⁄ects are taken into consideration (UP 2007)
2.4 Electricity generation tax: Some evidence
In 2008 the South African Government announced the intention to levy a tax on electricity genera-
tion in South Africa As discussed in the introduction, the aim of this tax is to reduce the country￿ s
emission intensity through providing an incentive to producers to switch away from processes as-
sociated with high levels of emissions. Since this tax will create a distortion in the economy, the
economic welfare losses of rising energy prices have to be compared to the social welfare gains of
reduced emissions.
The Scenario Building Team (SBT) at the Department of Environmental A⁄airs and Tourism in
South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2007) showed that any level of taxation induces switching
away from coal-￿red electricity plants and coal-based technologies. Despite the costs associated
with the switching, increased tax levels provide the incentive for switching away from coal-based
processes, and this is a desirable outcome from an environmental perspective, as well as being the
principle objective of the environmental tax. It is also reported that at levels beyond 625 cents
per kWh the economic impact will be negative. Results from the computable general equilibrium
model used by the SBT (Republic of South Africa 2007), showed at high levels of taxation overall
production and employment levels are likely to decline. GDP may decrease by between 2 and 7 per
cent for a tax of 208.3 cent per kWh, and decrease by between 9 and 17 per cent for a tax of 625
cent per kWh.
As noted earlier, tradable emissions schemes and taxes on emissions (or proxies of emissions)
are the two most important economic instruments in the context of emissions reductions. Due to
the monopolistic character of the energy industry in South Africa (see Section 1), a tradable permit
system would in e⁄ect become a command-and-control system. This would be the same as a direct
quota to Eskom and does not seem to make much sense (UP 2007).
Given the structure of the electricity generation market in South Africa, taxes on the fossil fuel
inputs into electricity generation seems to be preferable to a consumption tax levied on the use of
electricity (UP 2007). The consumption tax would provide no incentives to switch to lower-carbon
fuels even if the input tax is di⁄erentiated according to the carbon content of di⁄erent fuels. However,
the impact of an environmental tax on incentives to abate emissions can not be analysed in isolation.
The market structure and price elasticities of demand are both vital in determining who bears the
brunt of the tax incidence and how behaviour will change as a result of the tax.
Given the monopolistic nature of the South African electricity generation industry, passing
through the increased prices of fossil fuel to consumers should be relatively easy. This will serve to
limit the incentives to shift to lower-carbon fuels and as a result, the output-demand e⁄ect could be
more important than the input-substitution e⁄ect (UP 2007).
The price elasticities of electricity demand, as well as government price setting regulations will
also in￿ uence the extent to which the tax burden can be shifted to end-consumers. Blignaut and
De Wet (2001) calculated the arc price elasticity of electricity demand to investigate the e⁄ect of a
change in the price of electricity on the consumption of energy over a twenty year time period in
South Africa. They reported that the manufacturing sector is relatively price inelastic in its decision
making process. As a result, the price of electricity is a weak instrument to bring about behavioural
changes in the manufacturing sector of South Africa. Furthermore, since electricity exhibits the
characteristics of a consumable, essential as well as non-luxury commodity, it can be expected that
the demand for electricity will re￿ ect the same inelastic price elasticity globally.
4An electricity generation tax can be e⁄ective in the reduction of emissions, despite the inelasticity
of electricity, the monopolistic nature of the market and price regulation. Van Heerden et al. (2006)
showed the almost one-to-one relationship between coal combustion and electricity. An electricity
tax will increase the price of electricity This increase will bring about a relatively small change in
consumption. However, this reduction in consumption will reduce emissions almost on a one-to-one
basis (Van Heerden et al 2006)
Van Heerden, Blignaut and Jordaan (2008) modelled a 10 percent tax increase on the price of
electricity to determine the e⁄ect of such an increase on the consumer price index. The model
used in their study, UPGEM was developed as a computable general equilibrium model of the
Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria. The model database was based on the
o¢ cial 1998 Social Accounting Matrix of South Africa, which divided households into 48 groups and
distinguished 27 sectors. Also, the model￿ s closure rules re￿ ected a short-run time horizon. They
found the direct impacts of an increase in electricity prices were mostly negative on the economy as
industry production as well as GDP decreased.
The model presented in this paper simulates an equivalent increase in electricity prices, but goes
a step further by looking not only at the South African economy, but also the impact on other
SACU and SADC countries. Furthermore, the model gives a detailed breakdown on industry level
and distinguishes between skilled labour and unskilled labour. This should enable policy makers
to fully assess the impact of the proposed electricity generation tax, not only on a national and
international level, but also on an industry level.
2.5 Double dividend: fact or ￿ction?
If the revenue generated from the environmental tax is recycled in a manner that addresses the
current distortions in the economy, a second dividend becomes possible. UP (2007) de￿ned the
￿rst dividend as the improvement in the environment due to the pollution abatement e⁄ect and the
second dividend as possible improvement in the e¢ ciency of the economy. This second dividend
could be achieved, and the economy could move closer to the optimal situation if the revenues are
used to reduce existing distortions caused by taxes on labour and capital.
The potential of a second dividend depends on the initial state of the tax system. Where there
are initial taxes, environmental taxes distort choices concerning labour supply and demand as well as
investment. According to UP (2007), this tax interaction e⁄ect may dominate the positive e⁄ects of
reducing other taxes. In other words, a double dividend is not automatic, but depends on the initial
tax system and the initial distortions created. According to Van Heerden et al. (2006) a reduction
of the energy demand through increased energy taxes will not lead to a reduction of tax revenues
in South Africa due to the virtual absence of initial energy taxes. Thus, the loss of public funds is
limited if there is a shift in taxes towards energy, which makes a double dividend more probable.
3 Model and Data
3.1 Introduction
We apply the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, which is coordinated by the Centre for
Global Trade Analysis at Purdue University. The GTAP model is the pre-eminent modelling frame-
work for the analysis of trade and environmental issues across countries (www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu).
Nearly all analyses of Free Trade Agreements by governments and individual academics have utilised
aspects of the GTAP model and/or database.
53.2 The GTAP model
GTAP is a multi-region CGE model designed for comparative-static analysis of trade policy issues.
All GTAP datasets are de￿ned in terms of three primary sets: the set of countries and regions, the
set of sectors and produced commodities, and the set of primary factors (Rutherford and Paltsev
2000). The aggregation of the model used in this paper distinguishes four regions, namely South
Africa, SACU countries excluding South Africa, SADC countries excluding SACU and the Rest of
the World. The 57 GTAP sectors have been aggregated into 11 sectors shown in Table A1 in the
Appendix. In addition to the 11 sectors, there are three other agents in each region: a capital
creator, a representative household and the government.
The GTAP model features explicit modelling of international transport margins, a global bank
designed to mediate between world savings and investment, and a consumer demand system designed
to capture di⁄erential price and income responsiveness across countries (Hertel and Will 1999).
Macroeconomic data is used in GTAP to update the regional input-output tables to a common base
year - 2004 for the GTAP 7 database used in this paper. All the coe¢ cients in the regional input-
output models, initially in national currency units, are scaled-up to external GDP data in 2004 US
dollars. Thereafter, private consumption, gross capital formation and government consumption are
used to update the values of these aggregates in the regional input-output tables (Hertel 1997).
The GTAP model optimises the behaviour of agents in competitive markets to determine regional
supply and demand of goods and services Optimising the behaviour also determines sector demands
for primary factors, i.e. labour, land, capital and natural resources. In each region there are two types
of labour (skilled and unskilled) and a single, homogenous capital good. In standard comparative
static applications of the model total supplies of all endowment factors (capital, labour, land and
natural resources) are ￿xed for each region (in other words; South Africa, SACU excluding South
Africa, SADC excluding SACU, and the rest of the world). For the applications reported here, we
adopt a di⁄erent convention, with skilled labour ￿xed for each region, but unskilled labour allowed
to move across regions to eliminate any initial disturbances to real wage rates. This provides a
more accurate description of the South African economy, which is characterised by high structural
unemployment in the unskilled labour market and a limited supply of skilled labour in the skilled
labour market
Other key assumptions are:
￿ Public and private consumption expenditures as well as nominal savings in each region are
assumed to move with regional income. National investment is modelled as being responsive
to changes in rates of return on capital. Global investment is assumed to be ￿xed. Therefore
a region which bene￿ts more from an exogenous shock will, at the expense of other regions,
increase its share of global investment
￿ We assume that the exogenously imposed shocks in each scenario have no e⁄ect on rates of
commodity taxes, other than those used to impose the shocks.
￿ Here we assume that all technology variables are unchanged. For example, an increase in
the price of electricity has no impact on the technology used in the production of electricity-
intensive industries such as mining.
￿ Capital stocks are ￿xed, while rates of return are allowed to vary to accommodate the un-
changed capital.
3.3 The GTAP database
The GTAP database comprises of input/output data for each region; bilateral trade data derived
from United Nations trade statistics; and support and protection data derived from a number of
sources. The simulations reported in this study are based on a preliminary release of Version 7 of
6the database. Documentation for the Version 6 data set is given in Dimaranan (2006). The Version
7 database contains estimates of production costs, ￿nal demand values, bilateral trade values and
various tax levels for 2005.
3.4 Simulation design
The version described in the previous section is used to simulate a 2c/kWh tax on electricity gen-
eration. It should be noted that changes in trade volumes are those linked to a 2c/kWh increase in
the tari⁄, which is equivalent to a sector-wide weighted average of 10% (Blignaut, Chitiga-Mabugu
and Mabugu 2005).
The shocks were imposed via changes to output taxes in the production of electricity. An output
tax drives a wedge between the price received by producers and the price paid in the market. Thus,
we simulate a 10 percent increase in the output tax of electricity.
4 Results
A tax on electricity generation in South Africa will a⁄ect not only the South African economy,
but also SACU, SADC and the rest of the world via changes in South Africa￿ s export and import
volumes.
The e⁄ect of a unilateral 2c/kWh electricity generation tax in South Africa is shown in Table 5
Note that revenue neutrality was also simulated and the results re￿ ected no statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erences from the results reported below.
All the macroeconomic variables reported in Table 5, (with the exception of the real export
volume) decrease for South Africa when simulating a unilateral implementation of an electricity
generation tax. This tax drives a wedge between the price received by producers and the price paid
in the market. As discussed in section 2, due to the inelastic nature of the demand for electricity, the
price of electricity can be expected to increase by around ten percent. Since electricity is an input in
most production processes, an increase in the electricity tari⁄ will lead to an increase in production
cost and thus suppress economic activity. This explains the 028 percent contraction of the real South
African GDP. As the real GDP contracts, national income will decrease with a resulting decrease in
real private consumption real public consumption and real investment
Higher production costs will also result in a weaker terms of trade for South Africa. However,
a domestic demand decrease will outweigh the decrease in domestic production, thereby reducing
the price level Therefore, contrary to the expected outcome, despite the higher production costs and
weaker terms of trade, the real export volume increases by 0.7 percent and the real import volume
decreases by 0.69 percent The e⁄ect of the decrease in domestic household and government demand
can be seen in Table 6. Domestic prices will decrease in all the sectors. This is similar to a leftwards
shift of the demand curve in a static partial equilibrium analysis.
The reduction in production will also translate into job losses, with unskilled employment shed-
ding 0.77 percent. For skilled employment wages will decrease by -0.63 percent, also due to the
decline in real GDP.
A more detailed picture arises from a breakdown by industry production. Despite lower domestic
prices, three sectors will bene￿t from the electricity generation tax, namely: ￿ Grains and crops￿ ;
￿ Textile and clothing￿ ; as well as ￿ Light manufacturing￿ . These results are in line with expectations
as these industries are non-energy intensive industries (see Table 2) and should bene￿t from the
movement of factors of production away from energy intensive sectors. They also bene￿t from
reduced input prices since domestic prices have fallen.
The ￿Processed food￿as well as ￿Transport and communication￿industries will experience an
insigni￿cant impact on domestic production. The other industries are all set to cut production,
with the ￿Electricity￿ industry at -4.29 percent and the ￿Utility and construction￿ industry at -
1.84 percent being hit hardest. The ￿Mining and extraction￿ , ￿Heavy manufacturing￿and ￿Other
7services￿industries also record relatively high negative growth as they use relatively more electricity
than other sectors
SACU countries, excluding South Africa will bene￿t from the unilateral electricity generation
tax. South Africa is the dominant economic power in the region and the tax will improve the relative
competitiveness of the other SACU countries, speci￿cally in the production of electricity. As shown
in Table 7, South Africa will reduce electricity production by 4.29 percent and increase electricity
imports by 26.53 percent, while SACU excluding South Africa will increase domestic production
by 1.47 percent and increase electricity exports by 1.44 percent. SADC excluding SACU is set to
increase domestic production of electricity by 0.45 percent and increase exports by 0.58 percent. The
impact on the rest of the world as a macro region will be insigni￿cant as shown in the last column
in table 5, in line with the fact that South Africa is considered a small country in global trade.
The CO2 abatement has been calculated, using the greenhouse gas emissions inventory as de-
veloped by Blignaut, Chitiga-Mabugu and Mabugu (2005). Economic bene￿ts accruing to CO2
abatement was calculated at R100 per ton based on a low estimate of approximately Euro8 for a
Certi￿able Emission Reduction certi￿cate. As re￿ ected in Table 8, the reduction in CO2 emissions
in the electricity sector will be worth R949 million, and pollution abatement across the economy will
yield a bene￿t of R970 million.
A sensitivity analysis has been conducted on the price elasticity of demand for electricity in
the South African economy (0.47) and the elasticity has been found to be robust at a 10 percent
variation using the Stroud quadrature and solving the model 22 times.
5 Conclusion
The South African Government proposed to impose a 2c/kWh tax on the sale of electricity generated
from non-renewable sources; this tax is to be collected at source by the producers/generators of
electricity. The intention of this measure is to serve a dual purpose of protecting the environment
and helping to manage the current electricity supply shortages (Republic of South Africa 2008).
The primary objective of this paper was to evaluate the impact of such an electricity generation
tax on the South African economy. The paper ￿rstly considered the theoretical foundations of
an electricity generation tax and examined some evidence put forth by similar studies. It became
evident that in the case of South Africa, due to the structure of the market, an electricity generation
tax is preferred to a permit system. Despite the inelastic demand for electricity, literature suggests
that such a tax has the potential to reduce emissions.
In the third section, the model and data were discussed. This was followed by an analysis of
the results. As expected, the electricity generation tax will create distortions in the economy. The
real GDP, real private consumption, real public consumption and real investment will decrease.
Due to the decrease in domestic demand, export volume is expected to increase and import volume
to decrease, despite a weaker terms of trade. These results are in line with the ￿ndings of Van
Heerden, Blignaut and Jordaan (2008), who found that the direct e⁄ects of a 10 percent tax on
the price of electricity are mostly negative. This paper allowed unskilled workers to migrate, but
assumed a limited skilled workforce, and found that unemployment for unskilled workers is expected
to increase and wages of skilled workers are expected to decrease
It is therefore clear that an electricity generation tax will impose a cost on the South African
economy, in terms of a reduction in the Gross Domestic Product of South Africa. However, the
electricity generation tax is also expected to yield a positive e⁄ect on the South African economy in
terms of the bene￿ts derived from pollution abatement Ultimately, the government will achieve the
objective of the electricity generation tax, namely the reduction of CO2 emissions, at the expense
of a slight reduction in output.
A unilateral electricity generation tax will bene￿t other SACU and SADC countries through an
improvement in relative competitiveness, as shown by the improvement of the terms of trade for
8these regions.
It is important to note that the GTAP analysis presented in this paper has some limitations.
GTAP is a multi-country model focussing on the interaction among countries arising from the ￿ ows
of goods and services. Its representation of savings and investment linkages is relatively weak, and so
it does not pick up the possible inter-country shifts in assets (￿nancial and physical) that may arise
from the imposition of an electricity generation tax. Furthermore, the entire ￿nal demand system is
treated as the demand system of a representative household. It is therefore not possible to analyse
the welfare e⁄ects of the tax on di⁄erent households as there is e⁄ectively only one household in the
model.
The model does not endogenously predict the emergence of new industries, such as coal generation
with carbon capture and storage or nuclear. New industries must be exogenously introduced, with
the size and timing of the new industries speci￿ed by the model user. In the modelling conducted
for this study it is assumed that no new industries emerge as a result of an electricity generation
tax. However, this is a realistic assumption in South Africa in the short run. As discussed in the
introduction, Eskom is investing in expanding the electricity generation capacity in the long run.
The version of GTAP used in this paper is static, not dynamic. Accordingly, there is no al-
lowance for the inter-temporal linkages between investment and capital, and between savings and
consumption. While the model is able to project the likely changes in capital by industry and
region associated with an electricity tax, there are no endogenous mechanisms that allow it to
project the time-pattern of investment changes that bring about the projected changes in capital.
A comparative-static framework also prevents a proper analysis of the adjustment costs (short-term
and long-term) associated with an electricity tax.
For the simulations discussed in this paper, no attempt was made to include the possible e⁄ects
of climate change in the base case. That is, there are no assumptions made about the possible costs
under ￿ business as usual￿ , as a result of climate change. Neither do we include other more serious
predictions of climate scientists, such as the ￿ ooding of low-lying urban areas or increased forest
￿re activity. Not allowing for the possible e⁄ects of climate change means that we do not account
for any of the possible direct economic bene￿ts arising from abatement achieved by an electricity
tax. Also note that limited welfare analysis is possible, as there is only one household de￿ned in the
model.
References
[1] Blignaut, J., Chitiga-Mabugu, M.R. and Mabugu. 2005. R.M. Calculating a Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Database Using Energy Balances: The Case of South Africa 1998. Journal of Energy
in Southern Africa, 16(3):105-116.
[2] Blignaut, J. and De Wet, T. 2001. Some recommendations toward reducing electricity con-
sumption in the South African Manufacturing sector. South African Journal of Economic and
Management Sciences, 4(2):359￿ 379.
[3] Dimaranan, B.V. (ed.). 2006. Global Trade, Assistance, and Protection: The GTAP 6 Data
Base, Centre for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
[4] Hertel, T.W. 1997. Global Trade Analysis: Modelling and Applications, Cambridge University
Press. Cambridge.
[5] Hertel, T.W. and Will M. 2001. Second-best Considerations in Multilateral Trade Liberalization.
Review of International Economics, 9(2):215-232.
[6] McKibbin, W.J. and Wilcoxen, P.J. 2002. The role of economics in climate change policy.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2):107￿ 129.
9[7] Norregaard, J. and Reppelin-Hill, V. 2000. Taxes and Tradable Permits as Instruments for
Controlling Pollution: Theory and Practice. IMF Working Paper. WP/00/13.
[8] OECD. 2001. Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD: Issues and Strategies. Paris: OECD.
[9] Republic of South Africa. National Treasury. 2008. Budget Review ￿2008. Pretoria: National
Treasury.
[10] Republic of South Africa, Department of Minerals and Energy. 2007. Energy Security Master
Plan ￿Electricity, 2007 ￿2025. DME.
[11] Republic of South Africa. Department of Environment A⁄airs and Tourism. Scenario Build-
ing Team (SBT). 2007. Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Technical Summary. Department of
Environment A⁄airs and Tourism, Pretoria, October.
[12] Republic of South Africa, Department of Minerals and Energy. 2006. Digest of South African
Energy Statistics. Directorate: Energy Planning and Development. DME.
[13] Republic of South Africa. National Treasury. 2006. Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Con-
sidering Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa.
Unpublished Draft Policy Paper for the National Treasury, South Africa.
[14] Republic of South Africa. Statistics South Africa. 2009. Electricity Generated and Available for
Distribution (200811). www.statssa.gov.za.
[15] Rosen, H.S. 1999. Public Finance, 5th ed. Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill.
[16] Rutherford, T.F. and Paltsev S.V. 2000. GTAPinGAMS and GTAP-EG: Global Datasets for
Economic Research and Illustrative models. Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Colorado.
[17] University of Pretoria. Department of Economics and Institute for Environmental Studies, VU
University (UP). 2007. An Electricity-Based Environmental Tax for South Africa. Unpublished
research report for the National Treasury, South Africa.
[18] Van Heerden, J.H., Blignaut, J.,Jordaan, A. 2008. Who Would Really Pay for Increased Elec-
tricity Prices in South Africa? 13th Annual Conference on Econometric Modelling in Africa.
University of Pretoria, South Africa.
[19] Van Heerden, J.H., Blignaut, J., Gerlagh, R., Hess, S., Horridge, M., Mabugu, M. and Mabugu,
R. 2006. Searching for triple dividends in South Africa: Fighting CO2 pollution and poverty
while promoting growth. The Energy Journal, 27(2):113￿ 141.
[20] Winkler, H. (ed.). 2007. Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Technical Report. Prepared by the
Energy Research Centre for Department of Environment A⁄airs and Tourism, Pretoria, Octo-
ber.
10Table 1: South Africa’s electricity capacity – 2004  
 
ENERGY SOURCE  CAPACITY (MW)  PERCENT OF TOTAL
Coal 38  209  88.8
Nuclear 1  800  4.2
Bagasse 105  0.2
Hydro 668  1.6
Gas turbines  660  1.5
Pumped storage  1 580  3.7
Total 43  022  100
Source: Republic of South Africa 2006 
 
Table 2: Electricity consumption by industry 
 










Electricity 14.06 1.53 0.45 
Grains and crops  0.00 1.59 4.13 
 
Livestock and meat products 
0.04 2.15 0.65 
Mining and extraction  50.89 3.05 14.58 
Processed food  0.05 5.21 4.77 
Textiles and clothing  0.20 2.22 1.90 
Light Manufacturing  1.95 11.15 16.38 
Heavy Manufacturing  8.37 18.46 44.12 
Utilities and construction  10.96 4.64 0.13 
Transport and communication  3.57 17.99 6.75 
Other services  9.90 32.01 6.12 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: GTAP database, Preliminary version 7 
 








2000 4719  4007  -712
2001 7247  6519  -728
2002 7873  6950  -923
2003 6739  10136  3397
2004 8026  12453  4427
2005 9199  12884  3685
2006 9782  13766  3984
2007 11348  14496  3148
20081 9492 12968 3476
 




                                                  
1 The data for 2008 is only for the first 11 months. 
11Table 4: Environmental taxes and charges 
 
Environmental taxes and charges can be classified in a number of ways. An environmental tax is 
defined by the OECD as “tax whose tax base is a physical unit (or proxy of it) that has proven 
specific negative impact on the environment”. 
 
The National Treasury noted that classification of environmental taxes according to the tax base 
and not the intent of the tax is important for the following reasons: 
•  It is in line with international practices and facilitates cross-country comparisons; 
•  Unintended environmental outcomes are captured; and 
•  It provides a consistent framework to evaluate the impact of a particular tax instrument 
over time irrespective of the original intent. 
 
 
Tax  A tax is a compulsory unrequited payment not proportional to the good 
or service received in return for that payment. Important characteristics 
of a tax include: beneficiaries constitute distinct groups of agents; no 
direct benefits accrue to individual beneficiaries in exchange for 
payments; payments are enforced in terms of legislation; and Government 
or organs of the State direct the use of tax revenues. 
User Charge  A user charge is a requited payment for a specific service rendered. These 
payments are based on the individual benefit principle and attempt to link 
the amount paid to the benefit received by a specific individual. 
Important characteristics of a user charge include: the provision of a 
marketable service to individual beneficiaries; direct benefits accrue to 
beneficiaries in exchange for payments; and transactions take place in a 
willing buyer market. As a guiding rule, user charges should not exceed 
the average cost of providing the service. In some instances, user charges 
might be set below average cost to ensure affordability. 
Levy  A statutory levy is a compulsory payment and is, therefore, a tax. 
Earmarked Tax  An earmarked tax is a tax, the revenues from which are used to finance a 
specific activity or programme. 



















12Table 5: Effects of an electricity generation tax in South Africa 
 (Percentage deviations from no-tax case) 
 
 SOUTH  AFRICA SACUEXCSA SADCEXCSA ROW 
Real GDP  -0.28 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Real private consumption  -0.40 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Real public consumption  -0.17 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Real investment  -2.29 0.12 0.07 0.01 
Real import volume  -0.69 0.13 0.04 0.00 
Real export volume  0.70 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
Terms of Trade  -0.15 0.60 0.02 0.00 
Unskilled employment  -0.77 0.07 0.01 0.00 
Skilled employment wage  -0.63 0.07 0.04 0.00 
    
Industry production    
Electricity -4.29 1.47 0.45 0.02 
Grains and crops  0.31  -0.07 -0.02 0.00 
Livestock and meat products -0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Mining and extraction  -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Processed food  0.01  -0.06 -0.02 0.00 
Textiles and clothing  0.34  0.15 -0.02 0.00 
Light Manufacturing  0.12  -0.29 -0.14 0.00 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.18 0.01 -0.09 0.00 
Utilities and construction  -1.84 0.10 0.06 0.01 
Transport and communication 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other services  -0.19 0.04 0.01 0.00 
 
Table 6: Demand and market price changes: South Africa 
 
  Household demand Government demand Market price 
Electricity -3.37 -9.24 10.00
Grains and crops  -0.29 -0.51 -0.26
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.32 -0.51 -0.32
Mining and extraction  -0.50 -0.71 -0.03
Processed food  -0.30 -0.37 -0.41
Textiles and clothing  -0.35 -0.45 -0.34
Light Manufacturing  -0.43 -0.59 -0.27
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.49 -0.70 -0.06
Utilities and construction  -0.36 -0.49 -0.28
Transport and communication  -0.38 -0.33 -0.42
Other services  -0.37 -0.17 -0.57
 
 
Table 7: Electricity flows (percentage changes) 
 
 SOUTH  AFRICA  SACUEXCSA SADCEXCSA
Production -4.29  1.47  0.45
Exports -35.01  1.44  2.09





13Table 8: CO2 abatement benefit: South Africa 
 







Electricity -9.487 948.68 -309.61 
Grains and crops  0.024  -2.44 23.19 
Livestock and meat products -0.001  0.14 -8.58 
Mining and extraction  -0.028  2.75 -50.9 
Processed food  0.000  0.00 2.66 
Textiles and clothing  0.000  0.00 35.3 
Light Manufacturing  0.019  -1.94 60.78 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.184  18.41 -153.03 
Utilities and construction  -0.048  4.82 -403.78 
Transport and communication  0.005  -0.45 4.9 






































Table A1: Sectoral composition of GTAP 
 
Identifier Sectors  in  Region
Electricity Electricity
Grains and crops  Paddy rice
Wheat 
Cereal grains nec 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
Oil seeds 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 
Processed rice 
 
Livestock and meat products 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses
Animal products nec 
Raw milk 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 
Meat products nec 
Mining and extraction  Forestry and fishing
Coal 
Oil and gas 
Mineral nc 
Processed food  Vegetable oils and fats
Dairy products 
Sugar 
Food products nec 
Beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles and clothing  Textiles
Wearing apparel 
Light Manufacturing  Leather products
Wood products 
Paper products, publishing 
Metal products 
Motor vehicles and parts 
Transport equipment nec 
Manufactures nec 
Heavy Manufacturing  Petroleum, coal products
Chemical, rubber, plasticprods 




Machinery and equipment nec 
Utilities and construction Gas manufacture, distribution
Water 
Construction 





Other services  Financial services nec
Insurance 
Business services nec 
Recreation and other services 
Public Admin, defence, health, education 
Dwellings 
 
15